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Abstract. This paper attempts two tasks. First, it sketches how
the natural sciences (including especially the biological sciences), the
social sciences, and the scientific study of religion can be understood
to furnish complementary, consonant perspectives on human beings
and human groups. This suggests that it is possible to speak of a
modern secular interpretation of humanity (MSIH) to which these
perspectives contribute (though not without tensions). MSIH is not
a comprehensive interpretation of human beings, if only because it
adopts a posture of neutrality with regard to the reality of religious
objects and the truth of theological claims about them. MSIH is cer-
tainly an impressively forceful interpretation, however, and it needs
to be reckoned with by any perspective on human life that seeks to
insert its truth claims into the arena of public debate. Second, the
paper considers two challenges that MSIH poses to specifically theo-
logical interpretations of human beings. On the one hand, in spite of
its posture of religious neutrality, MSIH is a key element in a class of
wider, seemingly antireligious interpretations of humanity, including
especially projectionist and illusionist critiques of religion. It is con-
sonance with MSIH that makes these critiques such formidable
competitors for traditional theological interpretations of human
beings. On the other hand, and taking the religiously neutral posture
of MSIH at face value, theological accounts of humanity that seek to
coordinate the insights of MSIH with positive religious visions of
human life must find ways to overcome or manage such dissonance
as arises. The goal of synthesis is defended as important, and strate-
gies for managing these challenges, especially in light of the plural-
ism of extant philosophical and theological interpretations of human
beings, are advocated.
Keywords: atheism; biological sciences; critiques of religion; evo-
lutionary biology; evolutionary psychology; metaphysical ambiguity;
metaphysics; neurosciences; pluralism; religious anthropology;
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The natural sciences, from physics to evolutionary biology, the social sci-
ences, and the scientific study of religion furnish perspectives on human
beings and human groups that are more or less consonant. None of these
disciplines is univocal, of course, so a brief presentation of their main
results cannot be completely impartial. Nevertheless, their provisional
conclusions collectively constitute the basis for a powerful interpretation
of human life that is characteristically modern, secular, and interdiscipli-
nary; I shall call it the modern secular interpretation of humanity (MSIH).
It might well be called modern secular anthropology in accordance with an
established philosophical use of anthropology, but that would be mislead-
ing in view of the existence of scientific disciplines clustered under the
heading of anthropology. Similarly, it might be described in ways that indi-
cate its connections with evolutionary biology, the social sciences, the
neurosciences, or philosophy, but every such discipline-specific name mis-
leads. MSIH is a large-scale interpretation of human beings that tran-
scends any one scientific, social-scientific, or humanities discipline and
yet is the shared currency of thought for most thinkers in all of these
disciplines.
Although it is an interpretation of human beings, and thus somewhat
philosophical in character, MSIH is a minimalist interpretation in the
sense that it extends beyond the results of the scientific disciplines that
furnish its major insights only by consistently coordinating those insights.
It is a theory in the sense of a seeing together of scientific insights into
human beings. Its force derives from the compatibility of those insights,
notwithstanding a few tensions here and there. Its appeal derives both
from that and from its modest posture with regard to other interpreta-
tions of human life: MSIH does not claim that it includes every worth-
while insight into human life, but it does demand that consistency with
MSIH should be a goal of any more adventurous interpretation. For
example, MSIH portrays human beings as ethically concerned but does
not pass judgment on the reality of the values guiding ethical judgments.
Likewise, MSIH presents human beings as religiously concerned in vari-
ous ways but does not venture a position on the reality of gods or on the
efficacy of paths of liberation that correspond to those human religious
concerns. Other interpretations of human beings may well take up such
normative or metaphysical questions; MSIH does not. This posture of
neutrality and the fact that it stays close to virtually unanimously held and
highly credible scientific results are the main reasons why MSIH is simply
assumed as a minimalist starting point in much contemporary intellectual
life. And why not, after all? MSIH covers a lot of territory in spite of its
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minimalist approach and is a truly impressive cultural and intellectual
achievement. These considerations are the basis for the argument that any
wider interpretation of human beings that values consistency of knowl-
edge or seeks a public forum for its claims ought to take consonance with
MSIH as a criterion of adequacy. This essay is concerned with the relation
between MSIH and one such wider interpretation, that of theologians.
Having broached the topic of theology, I will say a word about my
terminology. First, I am using the word theology in what may be an unfa-
miliar way here. It denotes the activities of religious-intellectual world
maintenance and exploration or truth-seeking inquiry about religious
matters (both descriptions are needed to encompass contemporary theo-
logical self-understandings); roughly, it is the intellectual wing of religion.
As such, theology is a meaningful activity for any religious tradition,
regardless of whether that tradition affirms the reality of a theos or not. In
fact, every major religion has traditions of theological reflection in this
sense. This is actually the usage of ancient Greek philosophers, for whom
god questions were lively issues but were not decisively settled along any
particular confessional lines. Second, theological interpretations of
humanity and the human condition have long been described as theologi-
cal anthropologies. I shall use this term when I mean an explicit theological
theory about human beings. I shall use the term religious anthropology
more generally to include not only theological anthropologies but also
interpretations of human beings that are implicit in religious traditions,
texts, and practices and that could be made explicit as theological anthro-
pologies. Obviously, this usage of anthropology should not be confused
with its usage in the modern scientific discipline that takes the word for
its name.
MSIH poses a double challenge to theological anthropology. On the
one hand, in spite of its posture of religious neutrality, MSIH is a key ele-
ment in a class of wider, seemingly antireligious interpretations of human-
ity, including especially projectionist and illusionist critiques of religion.
It is consonance with MSIH that makes these critiques such formidable
competitors for traditional theological interpretations of human beings.
This connection between MSIH and antireligious critiques has been felt
by some to be so strong that their own wider antireligious interpretations
of human beings are assumed to follow immediately and trivially from
acceptance of what I am calling MSIH. Richard Dawkins, for example,
does not even bother to make such a distinction (see Dawkins 1986,
1989, 1996). The over-hastiness of such approaches has been demon-
strated repeatedly by scholars who position MSIH in religiously positive
theoretical contexts, even though such theoretical ventures are themselves
extremely challenging (see, for example, Barbour 1966, 1997, Peacocke
1993, Whitehead 1925). But the close link between MSIH and anti-
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religious interpretations of human beings presents a challenge to theologi-
cal anthropology that should be noted and discussed.
On the other hand, theological anthropology that seeks to coordi-
nate the insights of MSIH with religious visions of human life must
find ways to overcome or manage such dissonance as arises. To appreci-
ate what such dissonance might mean, consider whether MSIH can be
consistently combined with the implications of such religious ideas as
soul (or jiva), reincarnation, creation in the image of God, anatta (no-
soul), spirit possession, exorcism, or the veneration of ancestors. This
would be extremely difficult, at best. What about religious experience,
sanctification, holiness, spiritual bliss, the dark night of the soul, prayer,
spiritual gifts, prophecy, wu-wei (active nonaction), flowing with ch’i
(energy), healing power, prophetic knowledge, or extrasensory percep-
tion? Is MSIH consonant with being under the command of God,
receiving the law of God, being in harmony with the mandate of
heaven, or encountering the Word of God? What about sin, salvation,
samsara (the process of reincarnation), moksha (liberation), suffering,
nirvana, atonement, or divine forgiveness? This list of religious ideas, in
addition to being internally inconsistent, seems radically dissociated
from MSIH. The dissonance problem is correspondingly severe.
Why, then, should we pay any attention to such religious ideas in the
process of trying to formulate adequate interpretations of human beings?
Why not solve the dissonance problem by simply discounting traditional
religious anthropological ideas as nonsense or fantasy? Whereas some
thinkers might well do that, theologians typically resist such an approach.
One minor reason for this is that combining the results of scientific disci-
plines to produce MSIH is a nontrivial problem, because of tensions
within and conflicts between the scientific theories. Rejecting religious
ideas because of internal inconsistency alone would be a move in bad
faith. A more important reason is that theologians are well acquainted
with the way religious symbols function in the lives of people, and this
typically leads them to an intriguing conclusion: Religious symbols
express significant wisdom about human nature, although sometimes in
arcane language. Moreover, the competent use of such symbolic resources
transforms human lives in impressive ways.
Now, quite plainly, the fact that billions of people find various subsets of
these religious ideas about human beings helpful, even indispensable,
demands an explanation. Most analysts begin that explanation by agreeing
that people and groups need and construct broader, even religious, inter-
pretations of their nature and situation in order to make sense of their
experience and to guide action. The theologian, however, typically leads
the way in regarding the transformative and orienting power of such relig-
ious symbols as prima facie evidence that their claim to express wisdom
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should be taken seriously. According to the theologian, we cannot simply
dispense with large-scale theological interpretations of human beings, at
least not without due care. This insistence has two consequences. On the
one hand, at least some theology is compelled to embrace the challenge of
seeking a critical synthesis of MSIH and traditional religious insight. On
the other hand, because of its familiarity with the wisdom of religious tra-
ditions, theology throws its own challenge at anyone developing wider
interpretations of human beings: can the virtues, including the efficacy, of
traditional religious wisdom be registered, even if in dramatically translated
and revalued terms?
In this essay I address the double challenge that MSIH poses to theo-
logical anthropology, and the challenge that theology issues in return. I
begin with a review of MSIH to establish a baseline for further discussion.
I cannot give the same kind of review for theological anthropology, how-
ever, because religious views of human beings are enormously diverse. In
fact, the contemporary discipline of religious studies is on average
inclined to doubt that there is even one religiously crucial characterization
of human beings that is important to all major strands of every major
religious tradition. I will be content with the vague characterization of
religious anthropologies as expressive of profound, if preliminary and
unsystematic, wisdom about human nature and the human situation.
THE MODERN SECULAR INTERPRETATION OF HUMANITY
MSIH can be sketched without too much distortion in spite of the com-
plexities involved, such as theoretical disputes within each discipline and
conceptual tensions between disciplines. I aim to show that a unified inter-
disciplinary interpretation of human beings exists and that it has a dynamic
structure: a unanimously agreed-on center around which are clustered a
number of contested issues, each of which is the focus of ongoing investi-
gation. MSIH is defined primarily by the unanimous core and secondarily
by contested issues in the sciences, together with a series of cautious pos-
tures toward those debates, each posture guided both by the probable out-
come of scientific research programs and by habits of thinking proven
effective in the sciences. The general policy is caution: MSIH does not run
ahead of scientific consensus. Thus, it is content to register disagreements
and adopt probabilistic stances where a more adventurous interpretation of
human beings might leap decisively to a less well-grounded conclusion. Of
course, because of this dynamic structure, to sketch MSIH is partly a mat-
ter of describing scientific consensus and partly a matter of constructing a
framework within which scientific agreements and disagreements can be
understood as contributing to a large-scale interpretation of human beings.
I shall try to distinguish between the descriptive and constructive modes of
sketching MSIH where necessary.
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This review will be from the bottom up, as it were, beginning the story
with evolutionary biology, which of course presupposes and is consistent
with biochemistry and physics.
Evolutionary Biology. Evolutionary biology presents a vision of
human beings as the complex, provisional products of an ongoing process
—a process regulated by natural laws and open to chance events. All evo-
lutionary biologists agree that evolution is a process driven by chance
variations in the genetic makeup of organisms, competition for resources
within niches that make such variations relevant to the probability of
reproducing healthy offspring, and then the natural selection of genetic
variants that best succeed in reproducing. These basic insights constitute
the pillars of the modern synthesis between Darwinian evolutionary the-
ory and the theory of genetics: genetic variation, competition, differential
reproductive advantage, natural selection, and genetic transmission. This
is one of the greatest intellectual achievements of all time, regardless of
culture, and its implications for human self-understanding constitute a
striking advance with which every philosophical and religious tradition
must come to terms.
The modern synthesis has proved correct in the general outline of what
it affirms and has proved mistaken only in details or when it has claimed
too much for itself, for there is much more to the evolutionary process
than the modern synthesis has recognized. For example, the assumption
of one-way influence from genes to proteins has collapsed with the discov-
ery of situations in which proteins modify genetic structure. The ability of
creatures to modify their environment in ways that alter the probability of
successful reproduction has proved more widespread than formerly sup-
posed (it is particularly obvious in builders such as beavers, hive insects,
and human beings). Selection effects across multiple species simultane-
ously have been discovered, demonstrating the interconnectedness of ani-
mal and plant life. And cooperation and altruism have been demonstrated
to be relevant factors in the evolutionary process, along with competition
for limited resources, which suggests that natural selection could be prof-
itably analyzed in terms of units of species or kin groups.
On this much there is general agreement. By contrast, directionality in
the evolutionary process is a contested point. Although some biologists
affirm that the evolutionary process has a kind of directionality without a
specific goal—an impulse toward complexification, perhaps—virtually
none affirm that the process is clearly directed, and the vast majority
assume that the process is entirely undirected apart from limitations intro-
duced by natural laws. The uncontested statistical reality is an ever-
broadening, niche-filling process of speciation, although the rate of spe-
ciation, whether or not it occurs in brief bursts punctuating relatively
stable periods of equilibrium, and the evolutionary side effects of mass
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extinctions remain contested issues. Statistically, of course, this character-
istic broadening entails a certain amount of increasing complexity on
some evolutionary fronts. The question of whether there is some impulse
toward complexity translates at this level to the question of whether the
statistically predictable increase in complexity is enough to account for
the complexity we see around us.
Among most scientists, there is an understandable methodological
preference for minimalist theories, until a failure of explanatory power
forces a change. But a number of evolutionary biologists have concluded
that the modern synthesis indeed suffers from explanatory impotence.
This dawning worry is driven by more than the question of directionality
in evolution; there are also problems surrounding the adaptiveness of
transitional forms, the relative absence of transitional forms in large tracts
of the fossil record, the nonexistence of incontestable examples of new
speciation (defined by the impossibility of interbreeding) in our own
time, and the statistical improbability of the trillions of exceedingly
unlikely events needed to make a complex organism regardless of how
long the biosphere affords for that development. All of this has raised the
question, therefore, of whether the modern synthesis leaves out a giant
chunk of the story: regularities in the evolutionary process that would
make less improbable the changes that have occurred, regularities that
could be described only in terms of higher-level laws.
However the controversy unfolds, nothing about the modern synthesis
is being abandoned except perhaps its overhasty claims to completeness of
explanation. On this universally accepted mainstream view, regardless of
what higher-level laws might eventually be discovered, the contingency of
the human species is evident: Our appearance is the result of a combina-
tion of chance and law, our physical form might have been quite different,
we might not have appeared at all, and we will be superseded by better-
adapted species for as long as the biosphere remains habitable.
Neurosciences. The studies conducted under the umbrella of the
neurosciences—from neurophysiology to cognitive psychology—have led
to spectacular advances in the understanding of animal development,
movement, sensation, cognition, emotion, and communication. Though
these studies are only in the early stages, there is a consensus among neu-
roscientists that the amazing capacities of animal brains are due at least in
part to the amazing chemical properties of the brain, and especially to
those properties arising within, and at the synaptic clefts between, neu-
rons. This agreement on the necessity of neural processes for mentality
marks an impressive advance over previous conceptions of human mental
life, and also constitutes the guiding hypothesis for future neurophysio-
logical research. But the mysteries of mental life are such that philoso-
phers and neuroscientists find themselves asking an obvious question: Is
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biochemistry sufficient to account for everything that brains are called
upon to do, including serving as the basis for personality, for the qualia of
self-conscious experience, and for every aspect of mental life?
Neuroscience makes a crucial contribution to MSIH by virtue of sci-
entific agreement on the thesis that human brains are necessary for
human minds. But MSIH is also disturbed by ancient questions—
essentially metaphysical questions—about the nature of human con-
sciousness. Neuroscience forces these questions into the open in a fresh
way that some believe allows science to make a serious contribution to
answering them. But everything in this area is contested: the probable
scientific conclusions, viable methods by which neuroscience might
contribute to such conclusions, and the ability of neuroscience to make
any useful contribution at all. At this point MSIH is forced to proceed
cautiously in relation to the various metaphysical and methodological
possibilities, delaying final judgment until the evidence permits it.
MSIH is not equally open to all hypotheses, because its policy of stay-
ing close to scientific results implies that it ought to be guided by the
probable outcome of scientific research efforts. With this we move from
the stable core of MSIH toward its dynamic periphery. To see what is
meant by this, consider the following example of a contested issue with
metaphysical implications.
Is there an explanatory gap between brain function and mental func-
tion, one that perhaps requires some version of the concept of an indivisi-
ble mind or soul that has been so familiar in the religious visions of
humanity of many cultures? How would we settle such a question? At this
early stage in the history of neuroscience, it seems to be a matter on which
with some justification we might bet either way, notwithstanding the fact
that many neuroscientists are skeptical about metaphysical souls. Con-
sider the pros and cons. On the one hand, a real metaphysical soul, in the
sense of a nonphysical yet individual locus of human personhood, permits
one to speak straightforwardly of a seat for freedom and the moral life. It
also has important religious significance for many traditions of religious
thought (though not in some forms of Indian Buddhism), especially in
regard to life after death, and arguably helps ease the problem of qualia
(though this, I think, is dubious). On the other hand, to bet on souls is to
bet that our scientific ignorance in this instance cannot be overcome. But
theological betting on gaps has produced poor returns over the centuries,
and the prospects are not much better this time, because the causal con-
nections between both healthy and damaged brains and emotion, person-
ality, and action are already well established. Furthermore, if we posit a
gap between the physical and the mental that might be crossed by soul,
then we would be hard pressed to make evolutionary sense of the emer-
gence of Homo sapiens sapiens without invoking some evolutionarily
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unrecognizable injection of this soul at some point into human beings,
and then presumably at some point in the life of every embryo or infant.
The returns on such a strategy (which is in essence the one defended in
current Roman Catholic moral teaching; see Catholic Church 1987,
§§1–5; 1995, §§ 60–61) rapidly diminish.
Although I emphasize that the core of MSIH is defined by scientific
agreement, it remains important to ask whether MSIH leans one way or
another in such a controversy, one that is peripheral relative to the unani-
mous core of MSIH. I think it does lean—with most neuroscientists (this
is the descriptive part) and with solid justification (this is the constructive
part)—cautiously in the direction of betting on gapless continuity from
the lowest, least complex level of the organization of matter to the high-
est, most complex level. Most neuroscientists interpret the phenomenon
of qualia as an unexpected but still biological characteristic of sufficiently
complex central nervous systems. They take the effects of Prozac and
other mood-altering drugs to indicate that personality is intimately
dependent on brain structure and function. They view the causal connec-
tions between brain lesions and mental function (such as conception of
the self or perception of objects) as strong evidence that a gap between the
physical and the mental is explanatorily superfluous. They allow that
some important concepts in our folk-psychological self-descriptions may
emerge as natural kinds at the level of brain function, in the way that the
concept of learning something until it becomes second nature neatly cor-
responds to the processes by which various kinds of nondeclarative, non-
cognitive memories are established. But they fully expect others to find no
natural correlation with brain processes and functions, in the way that
almost all emotion seems too diffuse in terms of brain function to be a
meaningful natural kind at the neurophysiological level. How the folk-
psychological category of soul will fare with time and more detailed
knowledge of the brain is hard to say. But if its usefulness persists, then
MSIH bets that it is more likely to be retained as a higher-level descrip-
tion of brain processes that can also be described in more detailed terms at
a variety of lower levels.
This is a bet, of course, a probabilistic leaning of MSIH in the direc-
tion of a particular metaphysical point of view; perhaps it can be regarded
even as a hypothetical stance in search of correction. It is certainly not the
decisive result that hasty secular enthusiasts might want. Nor does this bet
occur at the core of the interpretation of human beings that is MSIH. But
it does show up on the periphery, because MSIH is influenced, and
rightly so, by the methodological commitments of the sciences. The
metaphysical question remains genuinely open, but especially because of
the neurosciences, MSIH bets against explanatory gaps and in favor of a
generic form of physicalism, one characterized by complexity of
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organization at various levels of physical reality, within and between
which levels causal relationships are active.
Social Sciences. Sociology and psychology have yielded a vision of
human beings as adaptable, anxious, and curious; led by powerful psycho-
logical drives and needs for communal identity; liable to violence, mental
disease, and fantasy; and embodying ultimate and preliminary commit-
ments in linguistic habits, symbolic systems, and social organizations. The
sociology of knowledge has shown that human knowledge is always
socially located, sometimes trivially so as not to interfere with the public
standing of such knowledge, but sometimes in profound ways that make
it extremely difficult to allow for socioeconomic factors and personal
motivations in assessing knowledge claims. The details vary greatly among
disciplines and between theories, but the general outlines are affirmed in
common.
At the level of culture in particular, the needs for orientation in the
world and for legitimation of social practices find in the human imagina-
tion and in our capacity for symbolic manipulation a perfect match. The
result is the construction of complex, symbolically potent worldviews that
permit many cultural activities to carry on undisturbed by questions
about their legitimacy. The benefits of such automatic legitimation
include greater stability of economic and social systems and psychologi-
cally calmer and better-adapted individual human beings. All of this pro-
motes the uninterrupted advance of scientific inquiry and a wealth of
creative expression, from art to Zen meditation and from architecture to
zoology. Negative consequences take the form of an inhibited or perhaps
repressed capacity for cultural self-criticism and sometimes intolerance of
those beyond the boundaries of the cultural group or of those within the
group who do not conform to the group’s active structures of legitima-
tion. (See, for example, Berger 1967.)
To arrive at such results, sociology needs to identify meaningful pat-
terns within group life. It is only with such an interpretation in hand that
sociologists may discern anything resembling lawlike connections. Like-
wise, psychological theories of the influence of social and family environ-
ment on the formation of human personality and propensities for action
depend on interpretations that select out certain environmental factors as
the most significant features for psychology. Such interpretation is impor-
tant in every kind of science, whether it is interpretation of data or theo-
ries of instrumentation. But the dependence on a layer of interpretation is
so much heavier in the social sciences than in most physical sciences that
sociology and psychology have many more legitimate theoretical options
and conflicts. Nevertheless, these conflicts always surround finding the
causal connections among group life, family life, and personal life; the
basic assumption that nothing more is needed to account for the patterns
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we see in people and groups is not questioned in the same way, at least not
by sociologists and psychologists. They rightly adopt a minimalist
approach to explanation as a necessary component in the success of their
work.
Sociobiology and Evolutionary Psychology. The social and biological
sciences have joined forces in evolutionary psychology and sociobiology.
This has rendered social organization—including moral and religious
traditions and practices—increasingly susceptible to forceful analyses in
terms of drives toward genetic perpetuation. Whereas the sociology of
knowledge drew our attention to the fact that the presuppositions of our
world making were received from others and are usually not capable of
decisive justification, evolutionary psychology provides a partial vision of
the motivation for world making: It is a matter not merely of a need for
existential orientation but also of a struggle to ensure genetic self-
perpetuation. This drive to genetic self-perpetuation is expressed first psy-
chologically, in the drives for personal survival and reproduction, and
then socially, in the drive for kin group and species survival.
Evolutionary psychology and sociobiology have some trouble account-
ing for cultural variations in ethical and religious worldviews; we might
expect more uniformity in moral convictions than we in fact seem to find.
Since gene perpetuation is a specieswide interest, however, it makes sense
to look more closely. It may well turn out that the variations in moral
convictions are relatively minor when compared with the larger agree-
ments, and it may also be discovered that serious variations can be ren-
dered explicable with reference to peculiar contextual features of
individual groups. This is research that mostly remains to be done. Never-
theless, it is already obvious that evolutionary psychology and sociobiol-
ogy are useful tools for understanding aspects of many kinds of cultural
and ethical practices, and especially those with some cross-cultural gener-
ality. Here again we see a distinction between a unanimous contribution
to the core of MSIH and contested areas that are registered around its
periphery.
Theories of Ethics and Religion. Projective and illusionist theories of
ethics and religion have been given impetus by these developments in
MSIH. The interpretations of religion furnished in the early decades of
what was to become the sociology and psychology of religion—theories
associated with names such as Ludwig Feuerbach, Karl Marx, Friedrich
Nietzsche, Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, Sigmund Freud, and William
James—all presupposed that human beings are bundles of drives and
impulses grouped in dense relational networks with other such bundles,
and that they need and have the means to construct interpretations of the
world that are good for both orienting themselves within it and managing
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group life. These early theorists and their heirs have to a considerable
extent made good on this presupposition.
The projective impulse, though explained in widely varying ways by
individual theorists, seems indispensable for understanding religious
worldviews and the origins and functions of myth and ritual. Likewise,
the psychological needs for orientation to the world and for social stability
—arising in part from evolutionary drives and depending on the projec-
tive impulse for its satisfaction—are crucial components in any adequate
account of ethical and religious systems. Such systems may have origi-
nated as codifications of the highest convictions of the groups in which
they emerged. For example, a close analysis of ethical rules concerning
marriage and violence according to evolutionary biology makes it clear
how following those rules satisfies gene-perpetuation instincts at the per-
sonal and kin level. Game theory has proved useful for this purpose
because it helps us to understand how such interests could be fostered
more effectively by altruistic behavior than by outright selfishness under
certain circumstances.
Similarly, religious concepts such as God and karma and Dao can have
a profound regulative effect on social life: They legitimate religious-moral
rules by weaving them into narratives that are broad enough to embrace
ideas about nature and history at the same time. Moreover, such narratives
can effectively furnish existential orientation and comfort as well as group
purpose and identity. Such lines of analysis have been standard fare in the
psychology and sociology of religion for over a century and have repeat-
edly made good on their promise of explanatory efficiency. For this rea-
son, then, MSIH counts these social and psychological dynamics as
indispensable components in any adequate account of ethics and religion.
Showing somehow that the concepts of God or karma or Dao corre-
spond to reality would not affect this central conviction of MSIH. In fact,
we may count it as MSIH’s greatest gamble and greatest achievement that
its account of ethics, religion, social groups, personality, and mental life
remains neutral to nonphysical, transcendental realities. MSIH feels no
need of hypotheses beyond those constructed from the raw materials of
physicalism, toward which MSIH leans in accordance with what has
proved to be the most effective method for advancing the natural sciences.
Likewise, MSIH sees no justification for rejecting such hypotheses out-
right, as an enthusiastic and hasty wielder of Ockham’s razor might. The
simple fact is that not enough data are available to determine the matter,
nor is there good reason to bet one way or the other as there was with the
question of physicalism. This is a limited form of agnosticism at the level
of ontology: MSIH is neutral with regard to religious realities.
This makes for an interesting contrast, one dictated by the shape of sci-
entific consensus. On the one hand, MSIH adopts a hypothesis with
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regard to explanatory efficacy in the sciences, betting that there are no
explanatory gaps, that some form of physicalism that involves connected
levels of complex organization obtains, and that the sciences and MSIH
itself will continue to display their customary brilliance in facilitating
human self-understanding at many levels. This is one of the great
cultural-intellectual wagers of the twentieth century and one that appears
increasingly shrewd with each passing year, though it will doubtless con-
tinue to have the status of a bet for many years to come. On the other
hand, MSIH remains neutral to transcendent realities, because the evi-
dence from nature or in human life, especially in light of the social and
psychological sciences, remains intransigently out of focus with respect to
permitting the clarity of vision needed to bet one way or the other. The
fact that there are so many religious scientists suggests that this is at least
as much description of MSIH as it is my own construction.
MSIH on the Relations between the Sciences. MSIH coordinates
specific results concerning human beings from a large group of disci-
plines. Just as important, however, MSIH enshrines at its core assump-
tions about the relationships between those disciplines, each of which has
its own characteristic data, theories, and forms of explanation. The usual
model for these relationships is a hierarchy, with each level corresponding
to a special science, and the space between each two levels corresponding
to the relationships obtaining between the higher-level and the lower-level
science. A more adequate model may prove to be less tidy, because the
relationships between sciences sometimes jump levels, but that would be a
mere adjustment. The great virtue of the hierarchy model is that it draws
attention to the dependence of higher levels on lower levels. That is, it
expresses the fact that ethics and religion depend on sociology and psy-
chology, which in turn depend on the neurosciences, with cell biology,
biochemistry, physical chemistry, atomic physics, and subatomic physics
following in order. Each level depends on the one below it in the sense
that organization, patterns, and regularities at the higher level occur on
the substrate of the lower-level structures and functions.
The concept of supervenience offers a convenient way of speaking
about the relationship between higher-level and lower-level properties.
We may say roughly that higher-level properties supervene on lower-level
properties if no two situations are identical with respect to lower-level
properties without also being identical with respect to higher-level prop-
erties. Of course, speaking of supervenience adds nothing substantive to
the conversation because it is merely a terminological shorthand. Pre-
dictably, therefore, the definitions of supervenience have proliferated as
theorists have tried to capture the nuances of the dependence relation that
obtains between higher and lower levels in MSIH’s hierarchy of the sci-
ences. This stands as a warning against trying to represent the concept of
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supervenience as a solution to the problem of the relationship between
levels of the hierarchy of sciences; a good definition of supervenience
merely clears the ground for a more substantive discussion of how
higher-level properties relate to lower-level ones. But none of the debates
surrounding definitions of supervenience and their usefulness jeopardizes
MSIH’s central thesis that a hierarchical organization characterized by
dependence of higher on lower levels applies between the various sciences
with which it is concerned.
I have argued that MSIH bets that there is no real explanatory gap at
any level of this hierarchy, neither in the dependence of cell function on
biochemical processes, nor in the dependence of mental function on brain
function, nor anywhere else. Of course, there is a great deal to be
explained at each level that no lower level can manage. But the working
hypothesis of MSIH, tentative though it may be, is that of its constituent
sciences: the basic constituents of nature, the way they are organized, and
the way they are contextualized are the most fundamental pieces of the
puzzle. That is enough to explain higher-level functions in a loose sense of
“explain” even though we ourselves can rarely provide detailed explana-
tions of one level using categories at any lower level. In fact, we typically
need to introduce concepts for characterizing the function of higher-level
systems in order to simplify the explanatory story and reduce the impact
of our relative ignorance of boundary conditions of complex systems.
That is to say, we would need to know a ton of precise information about
boundary conditions to explain how a protein opens the way it does when
a phosphate group attaches to it, and it seems fairly clear that we could
never give the explanation in those terms. But if we introduce the con-
cepts of protein structure and types of folding that occur under various
structural transformations, then we can get on with trying to understand
the function of proteins without having to worry about the nightmare
boundary conditions that would have to be invoked to explain in precise
chemical terms the protein’s folding and unfolding. Perhaps computer
simulations will eventually duplicate the structural changes, but there is
no need to wait for such confirmation before proceeding with analysis in
terms of the higher-level concepts.
There is always a chance that a gap is silently passed over when expla-
nation shifts to a higher level, because we can rarely show decisively in
particular cases that lower-order properties together with specific bound-
ary conditions produce the higher-order properties we seek to explain.
Nevertheless, MSIH and science in general hypothesize that the higher-
level explanation is really nothing more than a massively simplified ver-
sion of a lower-level explanation. That is, there is nothing problematic
about the explanatory gap because it is a gap merely in practice and not in
principle—we jump to higher levels of explanation to overcome the
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difficulties associated with ignorance of boundary conditions, chaotic
interference with prediction, our need to understand in terms of images
or manageable mathematics, and the impossibility of making sound cal-
culations or in most cases even applicable computer simulations of the
required complexity. Moreover, there are enough spectacular, explicit
demonstrations of how higher-level properties really do result from
lower-level properties that the assertion of no in-principle gaps (I’ll call it
the no-gaps hypothesis for short) is well attested. For example, neuro-
physiologists are learning how to reduce in detail the higher-level property
of the apparently fortuitous turning of neurons as they grow backward
from the eye toward the visual cortex to lower-level properties of chemical
transactions between proteins on the retractable growth cone of the neu-
ron and certain highly specific proteins in the path of the growing neu-
ron. With so richly and intimately detailed an account almost in hand,
the exhaustive explanation of higher-level properties of brain cells in
terms of lower-level chemical properties of macromolecules seems the saf-
est hypothesis. As a result, there seems no reason to assume that there
might be in-principle gaps between these or any other levels.
Of course, some philosophers claim that there really is something else
lurking in those explanatory gaps. For example, some of the more radical
process metaphysicians (see Birch 1990) predict that causal explanations
of biological processes cannot be complete unless explicit explanatory
account is taken of the contributions of divine input and concrescent
creativity in each occasion of the world’s becoming. If this prediction were
proved correct, then MSIH in its current no-gaps form would be over-
come. Most process metaphysicians, however, hold the less aggressive view
that the divine and concrescently creative components in the occasions of
nature give rise to the natural laws and regularities as well as the chance
occurrences and free choices that MSIH simply explains differently. The
decision between such empirically equivalent views would then have to be
settled on grounds other than those to which scientific experiments and
theorizing could make contributions. In that case, the minimalist, no-
gaps bet of MSIH could be defended without reservation. Moreover, the
great strength of the no-gaps gamble is that it increases motivation for sci-
entific discovery, because it is really only on the assumption of no in-
principle gaps that scientists would conceive of the kinds of research pro-
grams that they do. Aristotle denied the no-gaps view of Democritus in
brilliant, persuasive fashion (in his day; see Aristotle, On the Generation of
Animals v. 8), and the rule of Aristotle’s opinion arguably kept scientific
advance at bay for two thousand years (though his brilliant observations
set an impressive standard for some types of work taken up by subsequent
scientists; see the zoological works of Aristotle, listed in the bibliography).
From that point of view, at least, we are better off with the no-gaps view
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for as long as we are unable to resolve the subtle metaphysical debates that
would force a change of strategy.
The Significance of MSIH for Theological Anthropologies. This has
been a rapid survey of some of the main elements of MSIH, staying on
the main roads common to theorists’ various mappings of the wider terri-
tory and merely hinting at the numerous controversies on the side roads.
Nevertheless, even if I do not say much in detail about any traditional
religious anthropology in particular, it is clear that MSIH represents a
challenge to traditional religious anthropologies of almost all kinds, in
almost all traditions. MSIH is far more specific than traditional religious
anthropologies, even at the level of abstraction I have described it; it is
based on general principles that are cross-culturally applicable; it leads to
subtle models for the origin and development of religious beliefs in indi-
viduals and groups; and it produces predictions for behavioral tendencies.
Perhaps most important, it is a progressive theory and allows of apparently
unlimited correction and improvement in broad forums of public
discourse.
Although never beyond criticism or correction, therefore, MSIH is
theoretically impressive and conceptually sturdy. Its formidable array of
virtues entails that the burden of proof is on other insights into the nature
of human beings to show themselves consistent with it, or well justified to
dispute it. Because of this, MSIH must be given a central place in the
evaluation of specific theological anthropologies. This of course supposes
that theological anthropology aims to venture a vision of humanity that is
intellectually illuminating, publicly debatable, and theoretically sophisti-
cated; otherwise it can say what it likes without regard to any other per-
spective. On my assumptions about the purpose of theological
anthropology, however, traditional forms of it must engage MSIH. When
they do, they have found themselves with a lot of work to do to render
themselves consistent with mainstream biological and sociological com-
mitments, or even to find intelligible ways to disagree with those commit-
ments. This difficulty has two parts.
THE FIRST DIFFICULTY: THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND
CRITIQUES OF RELIGION
The thorniness of MSIH for theological anthropology lies partly in the
aid it gives reductionistic critiques of religion and central theological con-
cepts. MSIH may be formally neutral to the question of the reality of
religious objects, concerning itself only with the function, efficacy, and
causal properties of religious feelings and ideas, languages, and activities.
Yet precisely because of the relatively impressive way it handles what is in
its domain, MSIH can be used in theoretical valuations of religion to
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argue both that religion is nothing other than mental states, social dynam-
ics, natural functions, and causes, and that people think differently only
by mistake. Properly judicious scholarly contributions to MSIH can be
distinguished from the reductionistic critiques of religion that make such
effective use of it. The move from analyzing influences on religion or cor-
porate religious structures to the valuational posture necessary for large-
scale critiques of religion is readily apparent to most theorists; only a wild
and woolly few would insist that this move is logically coerced—and I
think they would err in so insisting.
So we might ask, where is the problem? Theological anthropology can
grant as much ground as necessary to MSIH, and the final interpretative
step still remains open for either religiously affirmative theological anthro-
pology or reductionistic critiques of religion carried off (perhaps) in the
name of fidelity to the goal of authentic human life. All that is needed, it
appears, is to make sure that theological anthropology is consistent with
the most strongly attested points in MSIH, and then the challenge will be
overcome. This line of solution is, I think, the correct one. But it is easy
for theologians to embrace it hastily, as if exhausted from worrying about
the power of reductionistic critiques and thankful for a way out. To avoid
the trivialization of properly reductionistic critiques of religion, it is
important to examine patiently whether anything may or must be learned
from these critiques before rushing on to secure theological anthropology
from threat.
For this purpose, it is helpful to notice that MSIH is awkward because it
offers a provisional account of every aspect of religion—from pious feelings
to sacred doctrines, from personal conversion to corporate rituals, from
ethical power to achieved sainthood. This leaves no special ground for
traditional religious anthropologies to stand on, be they cognitive-
metaphysical visions of souls and salvation or pragmatic-epistemic
processes of transformation. Enlightenment critiques of religion tended to
leave ground open for nineteenth-century religious romantics to build
reactionary theological anthropologies on, say, feeling rather than thinking,
or subjectivity rather than objectivity. But MSIH leaves no ground
untilled. Neither the domains of emotion, will, or intellect nor the loci of
individual or society are left as distinctive turf for specifically religious
anthropology. Neither the radical subjectivity of Søren Kierkegaard
([1846] 1941) nor the objectivity of the human position in the great chain
of being (Lovejoy 1936) is left untouched, so neither can be promulgated
as the characteristic, nonsecular heart of theological anthropology. Neither
Paul Tillich’s (1951) ecstatic reception of revelation, nor Karl Rahner’s
(1976) apprehension of an infinitely mysterious horizon, nor Sankara’s
(1965) cultivation of discrimination, nor Bhavaviveka’s (1989) process of
liberation from the illusions of reality, nor the Qur’anic portrayal of
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humanity under the command of God, nor the Jewish conception of a
covenant expressed in the giving of the law to Jews, nor the Chinese ideal
of harmonious existence in the ambit of the Dao of reality, nor the mystic’s
suprarational experiences—none of these ideas has proved impervious to
analysis and explanation at the hands of MSIH. Its invasion has been spec-
tacular and comprehensive, and there appears to be nothing to prevent this
invasion from being exhaustive as well. Though it must be admitted that
MSIH can handle objective features of human existence with more com-
fort than subjective ones, not even the most inward subjectivity is beyond
its explanatory reach, at least in some respects.
It follows that there is no simple strategy for blocking or sidelining
reductionistic critiques of religion, as there might be if religious anthro-
pology could be given some distinctive locus in human nature, out of
reach of MSIH. It also follows that the force of these critiques does not
depend on contradictions between religious and modern secular readings
of human nature—contradictions that might later be overcome. The pur-
veyors of these critiques are happy enough (and usually right) to point out
the respects in which traditional religious anthropologies express igno-
rance of, or mistaken judgments about, human nature (as perhaps in the
case of traditional usage of the concepts of soul or ecstasy or revelatory
inspiration). But the most viable critiques of religion are no longer para-
sitic upon religion, needing religion for their very self-definition, as athe-
istic or antireligious views tended at one time to be. Rather, these critiques
derive from stable and independent interpretations of the world that can
be turned to the criticism of religion or not, as desired. Ironically, then,
reductionistic critiques of religion have outgrown their shrill antireligious
origins to become mere components of large-scale interpretations of
human life with enough self-confidence to be able to appreciate the wis-
dom of certain aspects of traditional religious anthropologies, and thereby
to subsume what is deemed valuable within them. The core of MSIH in
its neutrality toward religious realities is accepted by almost all contempo-
rary large-scale interpretations of human life, whether religious or antire-
ligious. Where a disagreement with something at the periphery of MSIH
exists, as, for example, over the nature of the human soul in certain theo-
logical anthropologies, it can be acknowledged explicitly and stands as a
prediction that MSIH’s physicalist bet will eventually lose. Such an out-
come would not affect the core of MSIH, but it would be an important
development at its dynamic margins.
So exactly how should we assess the relative strength of traditional
religious anthropologies and the antireligious extensions of religiously
neutral MSIH? On the one hand, antireligious interpretations of human-
ity, being valuational, normative, recent extensions of MSIH, achieve
consistency with that well-attested vision more easily, whereas theological
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anthropology, being far older and thus bearing many concepts that are
foreign to MSIH, must struggle painfully toward a new synthesis. Moreo-
ver, antireligious interpretations of human life are to a considerable extent
able to subsume the traditional wisdom of their religious counterparts.
And they can explain the existence of religious anthropologies as merely
one more instance of projective wishing trying to rescue humanity from
the stark truth about itself: that religion is just a by-product of the self-
referential entanglement of humanity in its own confused need to secure
protection from the horrors and boredom of life. These factors explain the
marginalization of traditional theological anthropologies in contemporary
intellectual life, to the point that asserting them appears arcane or reac-
tionary—or even completely arbitrary, in the sense that there are no good
reasons to affirm them when consistency with MSIH furnishes a criterion
of adequacy. It is the comprehensiveness of MSIH in conjunction with
the appeal of Ockham’s metaphysically minimalistic razor that makes the
critiques appealing to it so potent. No wonder so many contemporary
religious anthropologies withdraw from the fray and depend heavily on a
privatized language-game strategy or on the fundamentalist reversion to
forms of external authority to justify their terminology and assertions.
On the other hand, religious anthropologies embody a tremendous
amount of wisdom with regard to the spiritual life, the agonies of suffer-
ing and guilt, the cultivation of personal maturity, and the honing of
human consciousness. Antireligious interpretations of human beings have
not yet found ways to incorporate enough of this vast body of knowledge,
because MSIH has not either; both are behind the curve in this respect.
Moreover, if traditional religious anthropology could be rendered in terms
compatible with those of MSIH—a virtue the recent antireligious inter-
pretations possess in virtue of their being born in the era of MSIH—the
first advantage of the antireligious visions mentioned above would be
neutralized. So there is a lot riding on forging and testing syntheses of tra-
ditional theological anthropologies and MSIH. Before addressing this
topic in the next section, however, we need to face squarely the charge of
arbitrariness that antireligious views of human life lay at the feet of theo-
logical anthropologies.
The charge of arbitrariness is simple to state: If you don’t have a good
reason to affirm a theological anthropology, it is at best arbitrary to do so.
We can leave unspoken what it is at worst. We might try to answer this
charge by saying that “reductionistic critiques cannot coerce rational
assent any more than theological anthropologies can,” in a kind of you-
too argument. The problem with this is that the theoretical advantage of
antireligious interpretations of humanity, which I have just outlined, is
significant: They are capable of subsuming many of the best insights of
religious anthropologies while explaining the latter’s mistakes as
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understandable side effects of being in the grip of a powerful illusion.
Theological anthropologies cannot do the same for their antireligious
competitors, at least not as specifically, and not without a thoroughgoing
synthesis with MSIH. The charge of arbitrariness is hard to shake with
such a direct apologetic strategy.
How, then, can the charge of arbitrariness be met? I think we need not
be creative here. It is enough to follow Tillich’s indirect apologetic strategy
of interpreting the category of the religious in terms of ultimate concern
rather than ultimate reality. In this way, we can treat as religious (in this
broad sense) certain of the so-called antireligious interpretations of
humanity—the ones that register an ultimate concern. Indeed, I would
say that this move reclassifies as “religious” all of the most interesting
antireligious anthropologies, such as the atheistic-existentialist ones heav-
ily invested in the concept of authenticity. The presupposed worldviews of
the reconfigured class of religious anthropologies would then be more
diverse and would include some that many traditionally religious people
might find alarming or distasteful. They would range from profound
atheism to Qur’anic monotheism, from Nietzschean perspectivalism in a
meaningless world to traditional Buddhist accounts of suffering, no-self,
and liberation. This richer scenario for theological anthropology is more
realistic because it enables us to register the power and delicacy of the best
of the so-called antireligious views. For example, we find in some atheist
existentialists an impressive kind of authentic fury or resignation, directed
toward or at least caused by a cosmos that condemns us to an unfulfillable
desire for fulfillment (see Sartre 1948, for example). This is as profound a
response to the environment of human life as can be found, and in the
respects that count, it is as religious as the most spiritual worship.
It may seem to be Trojan-horse foolishness to speak of theological
anthropology so generously, since it brings antireligious critiques into the
theological city walls. But whereas direct apologetic approaches fail, this
indirect approach neutralizes the charge of arbitrariness laid against tradi-
tional religious anthropologies by drawing attention to the religious com-
mitments (in the broad sense of “religious”) of so-called antireligious
interpretations of human life. Avoiding arbitrariness then becomes merely
one of several debatable criteria for the overall adequacy of theological
anthropology that must be weighed against other possible criteria, such as
doing justice to traditional religious insight into the human situation, or
detailed consonance with MSIH.
THE SECOND DIFFICULTY: COORDINATING MSIH AND
RELIGIOUS VISIONS OF HUMANITY
The problem of the antireligious critiques having been addressed, it
remains to consider the tougher challenge: How are we to achieve critical
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consistency between MSIH and traditional religious wisdom in theologi-
cal anthropology? Of course, theological anthropology does not strive
after this kind of synthesis by definition, but the question of how to
achieve it is no less important for that. I shall not try to present a com-
plete synthesis here, although that would be the best evidence for its pos-
sibility. That has been done with varying success by many during this
century, from Ernest Troeltsch ([1911] 1991) to Tillich (1951–1963),
from Bernard Lonergan (1957) to Rahner (1976), and among working
scholars from Gordon Kaufman (1993), Peacocke (1993), Philip Hefner
(1993), and Sallie McFague (1987, 1993) to the less well known attempts
by younger writers. Here I will content myself first with arguing that such
a synthesis is a good goal for theological anthropology and then with dis-
cussing a few guidelines for producing a critical consistency between
MSIH and traditional religious wisdom in a theological interpretation of
human beings. The virtue of these arguments is intended to be that they
broach these themes in new ways.
It is clear from what has been said that I understand theological
anthropology in pluralistic fashion, as including multiple approaches; this
is required by the partly ineffable character of religious realities. However,
I do insist that there must be room for a rational, public (i.e., maximally
scientific, within the limits set by the topic) approach to theological
anthropology in that mix of approaches; this is the approach that values
synthesis with MSIH. That approach is to treat theological anthropology
as an interpretation of human beings that results from a process of inquiry
under the influence of a confessional heritage rather than an interpreta-
tion of human beings that is merely determined from the outset by a relig-
ious creed or tradition. Such theological anthropologies can be better or
worse, and they can be improved through a process of inquiry that pays
attention to all relevant information, including both MSIH and tradi-
tional religious wisdom about human beings.
In my view, the fundamental hypothesis of an inquiry-oriented theo-
logical interpretation of human beings and their condition is that human
beings are oriented to primordial, ultimate mystery in their experiences,
their social practices, their drives and projective impulses, their longings
and failures, their malevolence and love. The process of inquiry associated
with the production and justification of a theological anthropology must
attempt to evaluate this hypothesis and not merely to articulate it. And
evaluation involves attending to the insights of both religious wisdom and
MSIH.
It is important to note that some theologians reject my assumption
that theological anthropology can be oriented to inquiry in some cases.
The reason this matters is that the goal of synthesis with MSIH is not
necessarily desirable when theological anthropology as a form of inquiry is
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rejected as impossible. The strongest argument I know against my view
and in favor of the independence of theological anthropology from MSIH
derives from an extreme version of the cultural-linguistic life world per-
spective. It runs as follows.
Is there not a danger in synthesizing theological anthropology and MSIH?
The attempt at synthesis mistakenly presupposes that theological anthropology
and MSIH are commensurable accounts of human nature, if only because
they can be deemed to be consonant or dissonant with one another. Under this
false assumption, seeking a synthesis may well induce even the most faithful
religious people in ever-widening circles to regard religious anthropologies as
arbitrary, even though the legitimacy of religious anthropologies should be
established by their efficacy within the life worlds that support them. That is,
seeking this synthesis would be both intellectually wrongheaded and needlessly
destructive of sacred and vital religious life worlds. Preserving the integrity of
the religious life world is the overriding value. It would be better in religious
circles to ignore MSIH and the view of theology as inquiry that forces us to pay
attention to MSIH if that is what preserving the integrity of the religious life
world requires. And this is, in fact, required. Accordingly, we must reject the
assumption that it is valuable to search for a synthesis between MSIH and
theological anthropology. Instead of a synthesis, what is needed is the mainte-
nance of an alternative life world, one not in thrall to the science-oriented,
hegemonic worldview that is expressed in the minimalism and even the relig-
ious neutrality of MSIH—one in which religious wisdom can be spoken of
freely and with conviction, regardless of what other interpretations of life are
offered elsewhere. Both MSIH and religious anthropology have their place
within cultural-linguistic life worlds, and the effectiveness of the orientation to
life thereby achieved is the only criterion for adequacy of such life worlds.
I am skeptical about this argument. Such an approach to the preserva-
tion of religious wisdom about human life will have diminishing returns,
because life worlds leak: they are never the secure, insulated bubbles of
discourse that this argument requires. On the contrary, some degree of
intersubjective debate and conversation is the only way to keep any par-
ticular bubble intact and viable for defining a life world for groups of peo-
ple. Historical accounts of communities bear this out in the long term
and often in the short term too. A critical consistency with MSIH is
therefore a practical necessity. Moreover, this argument gives up on
inquiry too quickly, supposing that it is pointless even to seek a critically
consistent coordination of sometimes divergent worldviews. On the con-
trary, however, the possibility of a synthesis can be assessed only through
extensive attempts to try to forge one. There are no good a priori argu-
ments guaranteeing that inquiry will fail or succeed in achieving its lim-
ited goal; we have to find out by trying. Thus, the synthesis of religious
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wisdom with MSIH is an important goal for theological anthropology
understood as a form of inquiry. MSIH and theological anthropology are
commensurable enough that anything less will not be intellectually or
practically viable.
There is great diversity among theological anthropologies that attend
to the problem of synthesis whose solution I have argued is so important.
This diversity is all the greater because I have followed Tillich in enlarging
the collection of theological anthropologies to include all those that regis-
ter ultimate concern, regardless of their presupposed worldview. The typi-
cal weaknesses in extant syntheses fall into several categories:
1. The failure to register traditional religious wisdom about the human
condition, as when the problems of human suffering and weakness
are neglected
2. The failure to register the impact of the biological sciences, as when
too much directionality in the evolutionary process is assumed in or-
der to ease theological pressure for a purposeful natural order
3. The failure to register the insights of the social sciences, as when the
demonstrated realities of projection, delusion, and social legitima-
tion are minimized for the sake of uncomplicated theological access
to the testimony of religious experience and tradition
4. The failure to come to terms with the diversity of competitive theo-
logical anthropologies
It is extremely difficult to tie all of this material together in a theologi-
cal anthropology. There is an especially obvious division between the first
three of these typical symptoms of failure and the last. This is partly
because intellectual projects that blend comparative and constructive the-
ology have only recently been attempted and partly because theological
construction that is sensitive to philosophical and religious pluralism is
typically not as well informed about the natural and social sciences, and
vice versa. These are historical circumstances that can be changed, and
thus it is on this fourth failure, the one that is most widespread by far, that
I shall focus my attention.
We have seen that not everyone accepts my argument that synthesis of
traditional religious wisdom and MSIH is an important goal, and this
should not be forgotten. If this goal is accepted, however, then with regard
to the pluralism of approaches to theological anthropology, there are two
major ways in which the synthesis might be pursued. Each way involves
provisional acceptance of one of the following two theses. Much of the
diversity of extant theological anthropology conforms to one of these the-
ses, and I shall try to make that clear by categorizing the major alterna-
tives in terms of the subtheses that follow each thesis.
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Thesis 1. The essence of humanity is expressed in its world environment
and relations, so MSIH gives accurate and indispensable insights
into human life and human nature. This approach appears in
at least these two forms:
a. All nature including humanity is oriented to mystery (di-
vinization approaches, philosophical Daoism, process ver-
sions of panentheism).
b. All mystery is limited to nature and its ground—there is no
supernature (secular humanism, religious naturalism).
Thesis 2. The essence of humanity is not expressed in its world environ-
ment and relations, so MSIH gives a misleading account of
human life and human nature. Synthesis in this case consists
in accounting for MSIH in the process of laying out a more
complete interpretation of human beings. Again, there are at
least two forms of approach here:
a. Proper discrimination discloses a higher purpose for hu-
manity to which theological anthropology should testify
(perennial philosophy, supernaturalistic salvation/libera-
tion schemes, most tribal traditions).
b. Proper discrimination discloses that humanity has no es-
sence, is nothing finally nameable, and nothing in particu-
lar; simply to realize this fully is to free oneself, to be happy
and at peace (especially Buddhism, Advaita Vedanta).
These theses and the classes of major worldviews they configure draw
fresh attention to a problem of arbitrariness in theological anthropology
—this time in relation not to antireligious anthropologies but to competi-
tive alternatives among the theological anthropologies themselves. It is
genuinely difficult to justify one approach decisively over the others.
Scant attention has been paid to this problem. I would hazard the guess
that each of these ways of interpreting human life has good prospects of
rendering itself consonant with MSIH and with traditional religious wis-
dom, at least from the point of view of the tradition it represents. More
research needs to be done to determine how good those prospects are in
any given case. I suspect that each would find some parts of MSIH easier
to absorb than others, and that the harder-to-digest parts would make
some parts of familiar religious wisdom less plausible but not others. But
advocates of theological anthropology-as-inquiry are interested not merely
in lists of the effects of striving for consonance between MSIH and hordes
of theological anthropologies but also in resolving disputes among theo-
logical anthropologies and using the insights of alternative theological
anthropologies to improve their own constructive projects. How might
this be achieved?
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With this we come to a practical contention: The public and cross-
cultural character of MSIH, together with its religiously neutral posture,
make it a potentially useful tool for resolving at least some disputes
among theological anthropologies that have seemed unresolvable in the
past. MSIH establishes a criterion for plausibility that permits rational
discriminations among various aspects of theological anthropologies. For
example, the joint message of cosmology and biology is that theological
anthropologies electing to centralize the human species in a cosmo-
historico-theological narrative (such as some forms of Christianity and
Islam) will have a harder time with MSIH than those that do not (such as
some forms of Hinduism and Buddhism). Obviously, using MSIH as a
criterion will not help in every situation. Nor is it the only available tool
for discriminating otherwise indiscriminable views, as the growing tech-
nologies of comparison and the long-standing effectiveness of criteria
such as internal consistency and theoretical economy demonstrate. Never-
theless, it does promise to be useful. Because it selects out aspects of theo-
logical anthropologies as preferable regardless of tradition, and because
any one tradition is unlikely to be decisively favored in this process of dis-
crimination (though that remains to be seen), the problem remains of
how to coordinate the MSIH-preferred insights into a coherent theologi-
cal anthropology. That, I think, has never been tried.
The appeal to the plausibility structures of MSIH, even as prudently
minimal as they are, can be contested. That is the point of Thesis 2 above.
But even in that case, the core insights of MSIH have to be taken account
of, if only to say in detail how they are misleading or how they disguise
some other, truer reality. For example, theological anthropologies that
assume a nonphysical basis for human personhood under the aegis of con-
cepts such as soul or jiva will have a hard time with MSIH’s bet on physi-
calism. This leaning of MSIH, however, especially because it is at the
dynamic margins of MSIH, allows intelligible dissent in the form of a
counterbet that physicalism is mistaken. But dissenters need to show how
MSIH’s reasons for its physicalist propensities can be taken account of
while still resisting physicalism itself.
Organizing these major interpretations into categories highlights some
of the choices that need to be made—or that are made unawares—when a
theological anthropology is defended. The main choice is between Thesis
1 and Thesis 2. The key to understanding this decision is the fact that the
two options are in dispute not over the truth of MSIH but over its status
as knowledge. Thesis 1 holds that MSIH is accurate and straightforwardly
true and demands nothing less than consistency from any theological
anthropology. Thesis 2, by contrast, argues that the most discriminating
account of human nature takes MSIH to be merely a preliminary insight
for which one must account without being misled into according it
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definitive status. On Thesis 2, therefore, it would be enough to explain
why the world appears such as to make MSIH so persuasive. In practice,
many who hold views consistent with Thesis 2 display little interest in
questions of the consistency of their theological anthropologies with
MSIH, for the obvious reason, as the Buddha himself might have put it,
that when the house is burning and you realize that you need to flee, you
don’t pause on the way out in a fit of scientific curiosity to analyze the
intricate pattern on the wallpaper. Nevertheless, these views would be
much strengthened if a persuasive account could be given of why the
world appears for us humans in the way that MSIH recounts, an account
that does more than simply appeal to suchness (as in some forms of Hin-
duism and Buddhism) or similar inquiry-stopping concepts. The omis-
sion of any treatment of so powerful a view of human beings as MSIH
seems deeply suspect, though in reality—for now, at least—it seems to be
at least partly the result of mere lack of interest. (This has begun to change
in some Buddhist circles, including the descendents of the Kyoto School
and Msao Abe; and the Abrahamic traditions have a long history of tan-
gling with the sciences.)
The apparently intractable problem of choosing between Thesis 1 and
Thesis 2 can only be resolved, I think, by hypothetically adopting one or
the other in order to test the feasibility of each. In a situation such as this,
the energy of personal perspective is necessary for driving the process by
which horizons are fused and thereby (in this case) the character of
humanity disclosed. For my part, when working specifically on theologi-
cal anthropology, I seek a synthesis of traditional religious anthropology
and MSIH in provisional conformity with Thesis 1. In other research, I
try to develop a more fundamental theory of human knowledge and real-
ity that is capable of explaining how the dispute between the two theses
can continue to seem intractable. My heart is with the latter approach.
But everyone, surely, no matter which approach is to bear the effects of
their energies, should carefully consider the arguments for the importance
of striving for some detailed synthesis of traditional religious and modern
secular wisdom about humanity. We may decide that the retrieval of a few
scraps of traditional religious anthropology is finally the best we can do,
because MSIH sets so demanding a standard. Or we may try to relativize
MSIH as merely a limited vision of human beings. We could then, with
Roman Catholic moral teaching, reintroduce souls perhaps as superven-
ient or emergent or even supernatural characteristics of sufficiently com-
plex organisms, after which we might be able retrieve a good deal of
traditional religious anthropology.
In any event, my aim in this paper has been to argue that MSIH is
important and must be dealt with by theological anthropology; that relig-
ious wisdom about human beings is valuable, even if it seems self-
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contradictory and out of harmony with MSIH; that these facts confirm
that striving for a synthesis is a vital goal; and that we have a choice about
the kind of synthesis we try to construct.
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